not meant seriously as a term
August 30, 2012
And no, I didn’t mean “pantranslationism” as a serious new term– it’s a monstrosity with its Greek/Latin mixture. My point was simply that the term “panpsychism” with reference to my position is a way of evading the debate as to what the threshold is for constituting psyche. “Panpyschism” functions too easily as a scare tactic to scare people back into a much scarier dualistic taxonomy in which people (and perhaps a few smart animals) are of a radically different ontological kind from everything else.
The flat ontology debate is a debate worth having. It should not be evaded by simply asserting that unless thought is radically different from everything else then the consequences are absurd.
That’s all I meant by “pantranslationism”– that whatever the special features of human thought may be, they do not constitute a radical ontological cut. If you think they do, then you invariably end up with a position every bit as extreme as panpsychism: a kind of inexplicable “ontological catastrophe” (the term is Žižek’s) in which thought somehow emerged inexplicably out of matter, which suggests that there is no material basis for thought, despite the ostensibly pro-science rationalism of such positions.