a difference between Whitehead and Russell

Here is one major difference (out of many) between these former collaborators turned chilly acquaintances…

This blog has already cited Whitehead several times as saying that logical inconsistencies are the most trivial of errors in philosophy: usually temporary, and fixable once they are pointed out. The problem with systems of philosophy, Whitehead claims, are usually more a matter of inadequacy and incoherence.

Now here’s Russell, neat the beginning of his own book on Leibniz. The italics are added by me:

“Having set forth the opinions which were actually held [by Leibniz], we can hardly avoid considering how far they are mutually consistent, and hence —since philosophic error chiefly appears in the shape of inconsistency— how far the views held were true.”

You all know I’m with Whitehead on this one. Logical inconsistencies are obviously not a good thing. They are red flags that one needs to think about a problem a bit more. But they are hardly devastating symptoms of poor philosophy. Indeed, I’d go so far as to say the opposite– in my experience, you know you’re really thinking when you get to a point where you’re starting to produce a lot of inconsistencies. Don’t get me wrong… I’m not saying those consistencies can be allowed to remain unresolved. I’m not making some sort of facile claim about the irrelevance of logic, just a practical claim about the thinking process. And I have noticed over the years that people whose primary goal is to iron out all inconsistencies in their views

(a) tend to be interested primarily in beating other people in arguments

(b) often have philosophies that are riddled with inconsistencies anyway; their very anti-inconsistency zealotry compels them to overlook such instances in their own case

It should be clear simply from everyday experience that there are plenty of “logically consistent” bullies, pedants, and bores. (Or at least as logically consistent as it is possible for anyone to be. No one has a perfectly logically consistent set of views.)

As I see it, missing the point is a far graver intellectual fault than making a blunder in reasoning. The latter can usually be repaired once pointed out; the former tends to remain invisible, and is hence more dangerous.

Here’s another practical rule that I think is very important… Don’t try to be too quick in resolving inconsistencies. The fact that they need to be resolved doesn’t mean that they need to be resolved in 2 or 3 minutes. Do that and you’ll end up with some sort of superficial stopgap solution that sounds impressive in arguments with others, but ultimately has no staying power. More often, a contradiction is a nice invitation to spend at least a couple of months letting something cook in your mind. Sometimes you’ll even find that you were phrasing the problem poorly in the first place, and to “solve” it would have been disastrous rather than helpful.