in fact…

In fact, this raises an interesting point… The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is one of the central points of agreement between all those who are called speculative realists. But this plays out in very different ways in all of us.

Brassier’s version of the primary/secondary qualities distinction is probably the closest to Locke’s, though I want to run that by him in person before I run too far with it. In any case, it is well known that Brassier is closer to scientific naturalism than any of us; just look at the authors he references, and you’ll see that right away.

Meillassoux’s book raises primary vs. secondary qualities in its very first sentence, so obviously this is central for him. But for him, primary qualities are the ones that can be mathematized (the polar opposite of my own view, which is that anything that can be mathematized is for that very reason not a primary quality).

In my own position, the primary qualities are the ones possessed by the object in and of itself, never made accessible to any sort of formalization, whether mathematical or otherwise.

In Grant’s case this problem may be slightly less central, though ultimately it is matter that is primary for Grant, while form tends to be secondary.

But at any rate… if this particular group of people ever assembles again, “The Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities” would be a good theme to unite us.

Notice, for instance, that this very point touches on where I depart most markedly from Latour who has no patience for such a distinction.